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Abstract 
In the present paper I take a critical view on the well-known discursive dilemma which captures the 
difference between governance by collective reasoning or governance responsive to majoritarian will. 
Then I suggest the republican concept of collective reason as a new perspective for study of EU and 
analyse the European Union as an example of a system which collectivises reason. From such 
perspective the notorious democratic deficit is explainable as the contradiction between collective 
reason and popular will. This problem brings home the conclusion that neither collectivising reason 
nor responsiveness to majority will alone can fully satisfy our normative demands. Thus, I claim that it 
is necessary to find a way out of the dilemma by a decision-making process that can bring about the 
two solutions in the same time. I suggest that in polities where people (as individuals) identify with the 
people (as a group) the gap is closed by a stepwise process of deliberation in the public sphere. 
Paneuropean deliberation is possible solution for Europe but in practice is obstructed by the 
competition from the spontaneous deliberation in the existing national public spheres. The latter are 
more robust, so they close the rationality gaps faster at national level; national public opinions tend to 
polarise and defend a ‘national’ interest against further deliberative challenges. I argue that the notion 
of competition is useful to explain why despite the development of the common democratic 
institutions at EU level and the emergence of weak European public, the deficit is bound to persist.   
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PORTRAIT OF THE EU AS A RATIONAL MAN:  
COLLECTIVE REASON AND DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT  
Vesco Paskalev 1 
Collectivising Reason  
In 1986 Lewis Kornhauser and Lawrence Sager2 identified a paradox in collective decision-making 
which haunts political and legal theory ever since. Philip Pettit, followed by a constellation of authors 
have generalised the original paradox to make it a powerful lens for understanding of political 
authority and many of the problems it faces.3 The Dilemma is the following: whenever a reasoned 
decision has to be taken by a collective decision-maker (either by a small board or a large population) 
there are two routes. First, its members can assess the factual premises relevant for the decision 
independently, reach their own conclusions and then, on the basis of these individual conclusions, 
determine the common decision on the issue by majority voting. Alternatively, they can decide on the 
premises together, e.g. vote on each of the relevant premises,4 and then, on the basis of the common 
estimation of the premises, embrace the outcome which is entailed from the premises by virtue of the 
rules of formal logic, modus ponens in particular. The two procedural modes will often yield mutually 
contradicting outcomes: “socially aggregating the conclusion-judgement gives us a different result 
from socially aggregating the premise-judgement.”5  
This can be illustrated by the following example. Let us suppose that a panel of three experts has to 
recommend the adoption of certain policy to mitigate climate change. Suppose that it is undisputed 
among them that there are three relevant premises the cumulative availability of which warrants 
adoption of the policy.6 These are: P1 – whether climate change is a real threat to society, P2 – whether 
the proposed policy will actually prevent or at least mitigate climate change, and P3 – whether the cost 
of the policy is economically bearable. However member’s beliefs on each of the premises differ as 
per Matrix 1: 
                                                     
1
 I am happy to acknowledge by indebtedness to Giovanni Sartor for his unrelenting support for this and my other work and 
to George Vasilev for the helpful feedback on the draft. Certainly all blunders are my own.   
2
 Lewis A Kornhauser and Lawrence G Sager, ‘Unpacking the Court’ (1986) 96 Yale Law Journal 82-117. 
3
 His core argument first appeared in Philip Pettit, ‘Deliberative Democracy and the Discursive Dilemma’ (2001) 35 Noûs 
268-299. For survey of the recent developments see Christian List and Clemens Puppe, ‘Judgement Aggregation’ in Paul 
Anand and others (eds), The Handbook of Rational and Social Choice (OUP 2009). 
4
 In most of the examples this determination is done by voting, but the result holds for any other judgement aggregation 
function like unanimity, supermajority, etc. See the original generalisation in Christian List and Philip Pettit, 
‘Aggregating Sets of Judgments: An Impossibility Result’ (2002) 18 Economics and Philosophy 89-110 or for a recent 
overview List and Puppe, ‘Judgement Aggregation’ (n 3).  
5
 Pettit, ‘Deliberative Democracy and the Discursive Dilemma’ (n 2), p. 273.  
6
 To keep the things simple throughout this paper I will take the premises and the whole logical framework to be undisputed. 
Certainly in different actual groups different considerations may be relevant but I will discuss this issue elsewhere.  
Vesco Paskalev 
2 
 
Members P1: Climate treat 
real? 
P2: Change 
preventable? P3: Cost feasible? 
Individual 
conclusions: 
A No No Yes No 
B Yes Yes Yes Yes 
C Yes Yes No No 
Collective 
beliefs: Yes Yes Yes ? 
Apparently there is a majority believing that each of the premises obtains. Therefore, if the panel 
decides by voting on each of premises, the decisions on all three will be positive and therefore the 
policy should be deemed adopted. However, if the panel does not decide on the premises separately, 
but each of the members makes up her own mind whether to adopt of reject the measure itself, there is 
a majority against the policy. Thus, the result in the bottom-right cell will differ depending on whether 
the decision is taken in premisewise mode (PWM) or in conclusionwise mode (CWM). Certainly, the 
actual occurrence of this contradiction depends on the distribution of members’ judgements on the 
premises, however in the complex policy-making of today there will always be sufficient number of 
distributions where the contradiction does arise. Even though the original paradox was identified in the 
cases of jury trial where the premise-conclusion relationship was specified by mandatory legal rules 
the result can be generalised: “a paradoxical distribution of views can arise in any group of three or 
more persons faced with a decision that can be broken down into at least two constituent sub-
decisions.”7  Even if the decision-makers are not formally bounded to follow any rule, they are 
normally expected to exhibit a measure of consistency in the propositions they officially endorse. 
Their common decisions are normally expected to conform to the principle of integrity8 so that formal 
logic, commonsense or recognized scientific laws may bind them just as legal doctrine binds courts. 
This is more interesting than it may appear, as rule-makers are typically considered free in their 
choices (within the constitutional limits at least). Nonetheless, they often face the integrity challenge.9  
Thus, whenever social choices are explicitly made on the basis of reasons it is likely that various 
majorities support each of the reasons yet a majority opposes the conclusion they logically entail. This 
will hold also if the decision-making body is extended beyond the three members to the whole 
population, or more interestingly, to any kind of body which takes into account the relevant premise-
beliefs of the population. It is worth noting that sometimes all members of the panel may individually 
oppose the policy yet it is collectively rational to have it adopted (in the example above this will be the 
case if A judges P1 is true and B judges P2 is false). Whenever this is so, the panel will “have” the two 
                                                     
7
 Lewis A. Kornhauser and Lawrence G. Sager, ‘The Many as One: Integrity and Group Choice in Paradoxical Cases’ (2004) 
32 Philosophy & Public Affairs 249-276. 
8
 A system satisfies the principle of integrity if “the different propositions it supports are consistent with each other.” See 
Christian List and Philip Pettit, ‘On the Many as One: A Reply to Kornhauser and Sager’ (2005) 33 Philosophy & Public 
Affairs 377-390, at 378. Consistency is judged according to logic or some other set of rules external for the decision-
making system. 
9
 Note that although in this article for the sake of simplicity I discuss only social aggregation of beliefs and not preferences it 
applies also for aggregation of their preferences if the decision-makers are required to justify their preferences by giving 
some reasons.  
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opposite views in the same time – a collective opinion in favour of the policy and “personal” views of 
all members against it.10   
The uneasy choice between the two modes of decision-making Pettit calls discursive dilemma and 
notes that: 
going the conclusion-driven way means adopting a course that is inconsistent with the premises 
endorsed by the group and going the premise-driven way means adopting a course that a majority 
individually reject. Going the first way means sacrificing collective rationality for the sake of 
responsiveness to individuals, going the second means sacrificing responsiveness to individuals for 
the sake of collective rationality. 11    
This dilemma seems akin to the one which Hume decided unequivocally in his famous dictum that 
“Reason is and ought to be the slave of the passions”12 yet the debate which one has, or ought to have 
priority remains unabated. Equally unequivocally Pettit chooses the other way, and forcefully argues 
for collectivisation of reason throughout his writings.13 Yet he acknowledges that in this way 
responsiveness to individual wills (i.e. to their aggregation into a ‘popular will’) will be lost; for him 
this is a price worth to be paid for the gains in collective rationality. In choosing that way he finds 
himself in good company – think of the Federalist papers for example – but his reason for doing so is 
his republican understanding of freedom as independence from arbitrary power.14 Apparently a CWM 
decision is arbitrary for it is not premised on any reasons which are collectively supported, therefore 
PWM should be always preferred. 
This is a normative claim which is not uncontroversial, but there is also a pragmatic rationale for 
preferring PWM to CWM decision-making: the capacity of the group to set its goals and to choose the 
appropriate means to achieve them (i.e. to act as an agent). Not all groups need to do that. For example 
the group of all passengers in a coach may need to decide collectively whether the music and the air-
conditioning should be turned on or off and there is no reason why their collective decisions even on 
related issues ought to be consistent. However some groups with regard to some issues need more than 
this. The inhabitants of a city have good reasons to pursue certain common goals, like the prevention 
of crime in the city. Such purposive communities ought to adopt consistent decisions as a practical 
matter – otherwise they will undermine their own capacity to achieve the purposes. Note that the 
commitment to certain goals is a social and not moral fact; the commitment may be a matter of 
deliberately adopted positive law or of implicit background understanding. Those groups need to act 
as agents and therefore their decisions need to exhibit certain degree of consistency and rationality. 
When they face the discursive dilemma, such groups must opt for PWM rather than CWM in order to 
collectivise reason.15 
Now, in the abstract PWM model it seems that all premise judgements are taken simultaneously but 
this need not be so. Pettit explicitly notes that the reason can (and needs to be) collectivised also 
diachronically and suggests that this can be implemented by straw poll and sequential voting for 
                                                     
10
 This distinctive opinion that a collective may form is the ground on which Pettit and Christian List maintain that groups 
may be agents of their own right. See Philip Pettit, ‘Groups with Minds of Their Own’ in Frederick F. Schmitt (ed), 
Socializing Metaphysics: The Nature of Social Reality (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers 2003) and Christian List and 
Philip Pettit, ‘Group Agency. The Possibility, Design and Status of Group Agents’ (Oxford University Press 2011) 
11
 Pettit, ‘Deliberative Democracy and the Discursive Dilemma’ (n 2), p. 274. 
12
 David Hume, ‘A Treatise of Human Nature’, (1739) available on www.gutenberg.org/dirs/etext03/trthn10.txt, at 2.3.3.4. 
13
 Note that collective reason should not be equated to what John Rawls and others call public reason; collective reason can 
be specified formally as the outcome of the premisewise procedure. Informally, decisions conform to the collective 
reasons when they are consistent with the earlier collectively rational decisions. 
14
 Philip Pettit, ‘Republicanism: a theory of freedom and government’ (Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press 1997). 
15
 List and Pettit, ‘Group Agency. The Possibility, Design and Status of Group Agents’ (n 10).  
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instance.16 Again neither seems to be implemented verbatim in practice anywhere. Yet any 
authoritative decision, which takes for granted what has been decided previously is in a sense 
premised on them. Collective reasoning should be understood in a broader sense – the PWM voting is 
only the paradigmatic model, but any polity which has some mechanisms ensuring that it would 
systematically display integrity is collectively rational.   
In practice there are various institutional devices to achieve collective rationality in such sense. Pettit 
discusses the depoliticization of certain issues and areas of decision-making, the proliferation of 
“contestatory institutions” such as constitutional courts which reduce “hands on power” of 
majoritarian institutions,17 indicative instead of responsive representation via consultative bodies and 
arm’s length appointees.18 To these I would add that many of the traditional constitutional principles, 
like separation of powers, judicial review, duty to give reasons, etc can be understood as ways to bring 
about the integrity of collective decisions. In the republican polity citizens have effective opportunity 
to challenge the decisions of their own representatives. By such contestation the public is to ascertain 
that the governance is according to democratically persuasive reasons and therefore collectively 
unreasonable decisions are avoided. 
Thus, any contemporary polity is collectivising reason in this broader sense but the exemplary 
contestatory institutions are nowhere more common than in the European Union. Not surprisingly its 
raison d’etre is recognised to be the rationalisation of collective governance. To this I will turn in the 
second section of this paper. 
For all its virtues, collective rationality creates one problem for democratic polities - it frustrates 
collective will. Certainly, appeals to reason to constrain popular passion have been justified by a 
constellation of thinkers like Rousseau, Condorcet, Burke, Madison and even Polybius; indeed almost 
all cannons of democracy seek to constrain popular will for the sake of common good, human rights, 
principles of justice, etc.19 Yet even while doing so, none of them abandons the notion that the 
authoritative decisions are in some ways responsive to the will of citizens. They could do that on the 
implicit assumption that by constraining factionalism or populist passions the “true” will of people 
will reign; in a sense the collective will was equated to collective reason. But having recognised that 
there is a dilemma between the two this is no longer plausible. 
Thus far, the dilemma has been discussed in the literature as a choice between two alternative 
decisional procedures, but it bears on the nature of political authority. It is a choice between 
submitting to acts of collective reason opposed by almost everyone and adopting arbitrary acts, which 
even if supported by overwhelming majorities are not premised on reasons which are themselves 
supported by such majorities (i.e. for the majority of people they are not reasons at all).20 As we saw, 
there are good reasons to prefer the reason to will if we cannot have both, yet if we abandon the 
                                                     
16
 See List and Pettit, ‘On the Many as One: A Reply to Kornhauser and Sager’ (n 8). In sequential priority procedure the 
propositions on the public agenda are prioritised in certain way, so that the subsequent proposition is voted upon only if it 
is not entailed by those already decided. In straw polls, a vote pro tempore is taken on each new proposition and if the 
result contradicts to what is entailed by a previous decision a vote which of the two should be revised is taken. For a more 
detailed discussion of the sequential priority decision procedure see Christian List, ‘A Model of Path Dependence in 
Decisions over Multiple Propositions’ (2004) 98 American Political Science Review 495-513. For the straw polls as 
method to discipline reasoning see Philip Pettit, ‘Rationality, Reasoning and Group Agency’ (2007) 61 Dialectica 495-
519. 
17
 Philip Pettit, ‘Depoliticizing Democracy’ (2004) 17 Ratio Juris 52-65, p. 63. 
18
 See Philip Pettit, ‘Representation, Responsive and Indicative’ (2010) 17 Constellations. 
19
 For a subtle account of this contradiction in American context see Joseph M. Bessette, ‘Deliberative Democracy: The 
Majority Principle in Republican Government’ in Robert A. Goldwin and William A. Schambra (eds), How Democratic 
is the Constitution? (AEI 1980) who is credited for coining the term ‘deliberative democracy.’ 
20
 This may seem to suggest the impossibility of a republican polity, but if the dilemma were for or against a theory that 
exposes a problem I would embrace it. 
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pursuit of responsiveness altogether, we are bound to face considerable problem that I shall call 
rationality gap.  
It may be argued that the outcome of collective reasoning is the common will (or at least that it is 
closer to it than the majoritarian aggregation of individual wills can ever be). But such redefinition of 
our concepts would not help as regardless of our normative theory, the actual divergence of the 
collective decision from the individual wills of the members of that collective would lead to their 
frustration; when the frustrated individual wills amount to a majority, we have a yawning gap which 
may threaten the very existence of the collective. Pettit acknowledges that some degree of conformity 
with popular will is necessary for the collective to exist as an agent at all. In their latest book, List and 
Pettit make clear that group agents exist only by virtue of the respective intents of their members. 
Certainly, the will to act collectively as a purposive agent in principle is distinct from the disposition 
that the agent should act in particular way; nevertheless one may wonder whether the frustration of 
members with regard to the latter will not gradually erode their support for the former. Indeed, if on 
one hand the attitudes of the group agent differ from those of the members and on the other, the group 
agent exists solely by virtue of certain attitudes of the members, it must be quite an unstable entity. In 
any existing collective agent a varying degree of trust, solidarity and the like can be ascertained 
amongst members and this can explain their tolerance to the rationality gaps. But if the group agents 
are dependent on certain stock of trust, which is not an unlimited resource, rationality gaps would 
deplete it. The republican theory would suggest that the responsible decision-makers should seek to go 
along this spiral upwards instead. I haste to say that nothing in my argument is intended to deny the 
priority of collective reason, it is only to assert the importance of the rationality gap and the impending 
necessity for it to be closed. In my view a republican democracy would need a constant effort to align 
collective reason with majority will. My suggestions is that the grim choice between frustration and 
populism might be avoided when we do not have to take member’s attitudes to be constant and the 
theory of deliberative democracy allows for some optimism with its promise that the individual 
attitudes might be changed in the process. 21 
It should be obvious that the rationality gap cannot be bridged by the design of the institutions because 
the opposing majorities against many of the collective decisions will spontaneously accrue outside 
these institutions. In real world decision-making both PWM and CWM happen all the time. When we 
opt for integrity and gear the constitution accordingly, the contravening individual attitudes towards 
the conclusion will be formed simultaneously even if no conclusionwise decisions are taken anywhere 
at all.  
This discussion provides us with a new perspective to the notorious democratic deficit of the EU. It is 
commonly attributed to the depoliticization of the EU, but if my argument is correct, it is not caused 
by the depoliticization per se but by the rationalization that is deliberately achieved, inter alia, by 
depoliticization. Now, this is a sweeping claim and a little latter I will discuss why in many actual 
cases the problem may be not so acute. Several factors may mitigate (and ideally close) the rationality 
gap but when they are absent or inadequate it becomes visible and threatens the legitimacy of the 
authorities. 
The obvious way to close the rationality gap is by appealing to collective identity or to bonds of 
solidarity.22 It is commonly asserted that some sense of solidarity is necessary for the outvoted 
                                                     
21
 Dryzek and List had already suggested that by deliberation which precedes the aggregation procedure some of the 
impossibilities can be avoided and therefore deliberation is a necessary complement to any mechanisms for social choice. 
John S. Dryzek and Christian List, ‘Social Choice Theory and Deliberative Democracy: A Reconciliation’ (2003) 33 
British Journal of Political Science 1-28. Below I will show how ex-post communication closes the gap, and will claim 
more generally that the gap is closed by a stepwise process of communication in the public sphere. 
22
 Compare with Pettit, who notes that the “identification [of group members] with one another will support a wish to reach 
agreement” on a “antecedently agreed set of considerations on the basis of which to justify particular judgements.” 
(Philip Pettit, ‘Collective Persons and Powers’ (2002) 8 Legal Theory 443-470, p. 448). 
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minority to concede to the decision of the majority, and the same may help a frustrated majority to 
concede to the contravening collective reason.23 This sense is a separate reason for citizens to endorse 
the outcome of the PWM decisions of their community or their government, even when following 
their own beliefs they would have chosen the opposite.24 More interestingly, the decision reached 
collectively may persuade the group members to change their minds.25  
Consider the example of a family deciding whether to buy a car. The family has three members (e.g. 
two parents and one sufficiently mature child) and the relevant premises are P1 – whether the car is 
needed by the family, P2 – whether the purchase is economically wise and P3 – whether the increase of 
the carbon footprint of the family is tolerable. Let the beliefs be distributed according to the following 
Matrix 2: 
 
Family members P1: Car necessary? 
P2: Car 
affordable? 
P3: Carbon 
footprint 
acceptable? 
Individual 
conclusions: 
A: Yes Yes No No 
B: Yes No Yes No 
C: No Yes Yes No 
Collective 
beliefs: Yes Yes Yes ? 
Again there are apparent majorities supporting each relevant premise.  A family which is collectivising 
reason would decide on each premise and then following modus ponens would have to buy the car 
even though the individual will of each member is against the purchase. However, unlike the panel 
members in the earlier example, here each member of the family is genuinely commitment to treat the 
car purchase as ‘our decision.’ Therefore, he or she may be inclined to revise his or her beliefs on the 
premises. C may just figure out new usages for the car and change position on P1. B may still believe it 
is too expensive, but start to consider it a well-deserved reward. After seeing the happiness the 
purchase brought to the family, A may also relax his environmentalist zeal.  
Similarly, in large groups where citizens identify with their group, they will be often prompted by the 
common opinion shared by their nation to revise their initial individual beliefs about the premises (or 
at least reconsider the relevance and the weight of some premises as well as the evaluations 
thresholds). In other words, the identity-induced endorsement of certain conclusion will lead them to 
practice modus tollens and eventually align their beliefs with the conclusions.26 It can be argued that 
the proper role of the elected representatives is precisely to facilitate such alignment.27 Thus the 
                                                     
23
 Note that albeit collective reasoning may create frustrated majorities this is not always graver problem than the one with 
the outvoted minorities. As Renaud Dehousse noted a strict majoritarian rule may feed up centrifugal forces, while 
collective reasoning avoids the divisions between winners and losers. (Renaud Dehousse, ‘Beyond representative 
democracy: constitutionalism in a polycentric polity’ in J H H Weiler (ed), European Constitutionalism beyond the State 
(Cambridge University Press 2003)). 
24
 I prefer to speak about identity rather than solidarity as in the case of rationality gap the controversy is not between 
majority and minority but between individual and collective conclusions. The controversy is relieved when the individual 
has some sense that he is part of the same (idem) collective entity and so the decisions are and ought to be identical. 
25
 This phenomenon is well discussed, see for example Cass R Sunstein, ‘The Law of Group Polarization’ (2002) 10 Journal 
of Political Philosophy 175-195. He notes that in cases when the group matters for its members “once they hear what 
others believe, they adjust their positions in the direction of the dominant position” (p. 179). 
26
 The suggested process should be considered as the social equivalent to restoration of coherence in individual mind in the 
face of contradictions described by Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (Farrar, Straus and Giroux 2011).  
27
 As John Parkinson aptly put it “Representatives are transmitters of information and instructions in two directions, not just 
one: ideally they convey the views of their principals, and they convey the arguments of the other delegates back to those 
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individuals are likely to practice modus tollens, while the community practices modus ponens.28 The 
most telling example of the latter is Britons’ overall opposition to the Iraqi war of 2003, which within 
a week changed to overall support, once the decision of their government became final (i.e. the war 
started).29 Apparently it is members’ willingness to revise their initial beliefs which is crucial for the 
rationality gap to close so that PWM and CWM decisions become identical.   
We can distinguish two phases of the alignment process – after the collective decision is reached the 
members who internalise it revise their initial beliefs. But in practice the phases will not be discrete 
but the collective position will be formed and beliefs revised in a continuous and incremental process 
of communication which goes both ways.30 When this process is successful decisions which are 
collectively rational and supported by the members are reached.  This is how the general will of a 
nation is formulated, as an instrument to attaining what is perceived as national interest. On the 
suggested account both are co-produced through deliberation in the public sphere. Indeed, it is 
robustly demonstrated by various social scientist that nations are socially constructed31 and also that 
individual preferences are socially determined.32 The conclusion that national interests are socially 
determined apparently follows from any of the two.  Certainly, none of the authors quoted goes as far 
as claiming that nations or national interests are created by deliberation in the public sphere. 
Nevertheless if my argument that only when decisions are reached by public deliberation rationality 
gap does not open is correct, it would follow that a single entity with the capacity to rationally pursue 
its ‘own’ interests which are endorsed as ‘own’ also by its members can emerge only in the process of 
deliberation.  
In this section we have discussed a dilemma arising in case when collective decisions premised on 
reasons have to be taken, how it ought to be solved and the problem that the preferred solution creates. 
It was also suggested that reason is collectivised by depoliticization and contestation, that all 
contemporary polities collectivise reason and achieve at least some degree of integrity and therefore 
they all face this problem. Finally it was suggested that the problem may be mitigated by deliberation 
in the public sphere if citizens sufficiently identify themselves with the polity. In the light of this 
(Contd.)                                                                  
principals for further consideration.” Speaking about the representatives in the so called micro-publics (John Parkinson, 
Deliberating in the Real World: Problems of Legitimacy in Deliberative Democracy, 2006, p. 32). 
28
 Pettit should be credited for the most concise definition of both modus tollens and modus ponens: “In short, it might 
involve practising modus ponens — letting the premises dictate the conclusion — or modus tollens — keeping the 
conclusion and revising one or more of the premises.” Pettit, ‘Deliberative Democracy and the Discursive Dilemma’ (n 
2), p. 277  
29
 On the suggested account democracy may appear as demagoguery, with political leaders manipulating the gullible 
population. While deliberation may indeed degenerate in this way, in principle it is legitimate for the leaders to identify 
problems and create respective interest groups. They are responsible to lead the public opinion in such a way that the acts 
endorsed by the group are collectively rational (i.e. to close rationality gap). Those are lead by the public opinion are 
justly scorned – by responding to public opinion and they undermine the capacity of the polity to pursue its goals 
rationally and consistently. Politicians have a responsibility to seek to close the rationality gap.30 In this paper I 
deliberately set aside the possibility that the citizens will use arguments to persuade each other, which certainly catalyses 
the process of aligning.  
30
 In this paper I deliberately set aside the possibility that the citizens will use arguments to persuade each other, which 
certainly catalyses the process of aligning.  
31
 See for example Eric J. Hobsbawm, Nations and nationalism since 1780: programme, myth, reality (Cambridge University 
Press 1780), or Benedict Richard O’Gorman Anderson, Imagined communities: reflections on the origin and spread of 
nationalism, vol. 7 (Verso 2006). 
32
 Citizens do not have ‘objective’ interests with the possible exceptions of protection of the core of their human rights. 
Beyond that minimum, interests are only perceived by individuals with reference to different groups to which they belong 
and as these groups overlap the interests contradict. Thus my interests as Bulgarian are different from my interests as 
environmentalist, which are yet different from my interests as member of the middle class. With regard to any of my 
properties I can be associated with different groups and within each of them conflicting interests may be constructed, i.e. 
deliberatively identified, generalized and defended.   
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account, in the next section I will turn to the EU as a polity which collectivises reason and faces the 
associated problem, which in this case is known as democratic deficit.  
The EU as Collectively Rational Agent 
In this section I shall discuss the EU in light of the republican paradigm. Although Pettit and his 
followers rarely discuss the EU33 it appears to be a good test case for the republican theory. Clearly the 
EU is not a system for expression and aggregation of the will either of its Member States or of its 
citizens. It is highly rationalised decision-maker and prima facie exhibits agential capacities which 
make it good empirical illustration of a republican polity. Now I will briefly discuss some of its 
idiosyncratic features to show how they enable collective reasoning (in the broad sense of integrity) 
and how their existence makes more sense as tools for collectively rational (as opposed to responsive) 
decision-making. This is necessarily sketchy and will rely mostly on conclusions in the existing 
academic literature. I also confess to have deliberately cherry-picked the features which work well on 
the suggested account but I think this is justified by the scope of the claim I make. I do not make claim 
that the EU is collectivising reason all the time, whether it conforms to the integrity principle is an 
empirical question; I only claim that its idiosyncratic features make most sense on the republican 
account.34 
The first question is whether the EU is a group which is appropriate to personify? On all accounts it 
seems that it is. Whatever the citizens stance on integration, even the most severe sceptics seem to 
expect the Union to act rationally in pursuance of certain purposes and to speak in a single voice; they 
expect it to act as an agent (ironically they need this also to be able to meaningfully disparage it). Still 
some people deny that the Union has any common purpose35 and is merely a system for facilitation of 
international cooperation, enabling the member states to achieve their goals. Yet such understanding is 
increasingly loosing its support in the positive law. The Treaty on the European Union (TEU) ascribed 
to it as a single body certain purposes36 and obliges its members to help to achieve them.37 Apparently 
it is treated as entity capable of having own goals. More importantly the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the EU (TFEU) stipulates that “The  Union  shall  ensure  consistency  between  its  policies  and  
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 The only piece in which Pettit discussed the EU is a short conference comment (Philip Pettit, ‘Comment on Walker: 
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constitutionalism, see Richard Bellamy, ‘Democracy without democracy? Can the EU’s democratic ‘outputs’ be 
separated from the democratic ‘inputs’ provided by competitive parties and majority rule?’ (2010) 17 Journal of 
European Public Policy 2-19.    
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 Eleftheriadis for example vehemently opposes the attempts to ascribe common purpose to the Union though not in the 
sense of purpose used here (Pavlos Eleftheriadis, ‘The moral distinctiveness of the European Union’ (2011) 9 
International Journal of Constitutional Law 695-713).  
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 TEU, Art. 3 stipulates that the aim of the EU is to promote peace, its values (listed in Art. 2) and “the well-being of its 
peoples.” It elaborates further that the EU has to establish area of freedom, security and justice; internal market, etc. (SEE 
OJ C 83/17). 
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 See TEU, Art. 4, para 3 which stipulates that “The  Member  States  shall  facilitate  the  achievement  of  the  Union’s  
tasks  and  refrain  from  any  measure which  could  jeopardise  the  attainment  of  the  Union’s  objectives.” 
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activities,  taking  all  of  its  objectives  into account.”38 This is perhaps the clearest requirement for a 
system to collectivise reason one can find in a legal instrument. Thus, I suggest that the EU is best 
conceived as a system for collective reasoning and therefore its institutions are required to exhibit 
integrity in their reasoning.39 
Why the concept of the EU as a (collectively) rational agent is appealing? It is beyond the scope of 
this paper to compare all of the many ways to understand the nature of the Union which have been 
proposed by the burgeoning scholarship,40 but I can try to seduce the reader by highlighting the 
explanatory power of the suggested account. First, it is powerful as analytical tool to better understand 
many of the complexities and idiosyncrasies of the Union which are ill-fitting to the classical 
majoritarian model of democracy. Second, it provides criteria for legitimacy of authority, which 
allows the evaluation of any decision of any public authority.  
It may appear overly ambitious to suggest yet another new paradigm for the EU for the EU. Yet I think 
it is warranted in two ways. On one hand, the scholarship of on judgement aggregation and collective 
reason has developed considerably in the last decade so it is a puzzle why it has not been applied to the 
EU yet. On the other, the burgeoning constructivist trend in the studies of the EU found overwhelming 
evidence for cooperative behaviour, deliberation, persuasion, belief-reversals, pro-norm choices, etc. 
While it is far from certain that the Union is the kingdom of the collective reason,41 the evidence is 
sufficient to claim at least that something more than utility-maximisation is necessary to explain how 
the decisions are actually made. 
It is well known that the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was created on the Madisonean 
rationale to prevent the excesses of the wills of European peoples in certain areas, which had resulted 
in suicidal trade protectionism and two world wars.42 The economic liberals today would claim that 
the Union is the embodiment of economic rationality which is necessary to constrain the populist 
excesses of the welfare state43 and many social-democrats will almost agree with that, by decrying the 
crude market rationality of the EU which constrains the wilful policies of national welfare states.44 The 
latest illustration of its function to discipline unreasonable national governments was in the autumn of 
2011 when two national governments were effectively fired by their European peers for failing to act 
according to the imperatives of the fiscal rationality. 
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University Press 2008), p. 2 “discrete economic sectors [to] be managed efficiently and technocratically by supranational 
institutions away from the fray of politics”. It is ironic that the Community was created because of the distrust of the 
national governments, the Union delivered on its promise while helping the national government to deliver on theirs and 
thus regain trust. Now, the EU is increasingly distrusted because it is a constraint of the re-credited national governments.  
43
 Giandomenico Majone observed that by Community regulation “industries want to avoid inconsistent and progressively 
more stringent regulations” in the Member States (Giandomenico Majone, ‘The EC: An ‘Independent Fourth Branch of 
Government’?’, EUI Working Paper SPS-1993/09  p.19). 
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 See for example the discussion in Fritz W Scharpf, ‘Economic integration, democracy and the welfare state’ (1997) 4 
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The rationalisation was and still is achieved by mechanisms for depoliticization and contestation. 
Although the framers by no means lacked bold visions for “ever closer union”, what they seemed to 
care most was to design a depoliticized bureaucracy able to deliver the decisions which are rational 
means to the stipulated Community ends. The European Coal and Steel Community established a 
surprisingly powerful supranational institution – the High Authority – to govern the two strategic 
industries of the member states on the basis of common premises enshrined in an international treaty.45 
This method goes on until today and all types of contestatory institutions Pettit enlists - constitutional 
courts, consultative bodies and arms-length appointments - are nowhere more common than in the 
European Union. 46 Pettit’s description of a contestatory institution:   
a depoliticized forum, at arms length from parliament, which can offer guidelines on what sort of 
activities amongst those offending against most people’s moral ideals ought to be legalised …. and 
how they ought to be regulated. This body could represent different sectors of popular opinion and 
professional expertise and would be able to take a long-term view, informed by sustained 
monitoring, of the costs and benefits of different overtures. ….”47  
could very well refer to the European Commission, with the only difference being that it offers 
guidelines on any other but moral issues.  
Giandomenico Majone is the most renowned proponent of the thesis that the Union is just a regulatory 
system, i.e. its essential function is to correct market and ‘regulatory failures’ and thus its decisions are 
by definition Pareto-optimal and therefore there is no need to democratise it.48 Just like Pettit called to 
reduce the hands-on power of elected politicians, Majone asserts that the European governments 
delegated powers to EU in order “deliberately to isolate [certain] policies from domestic majoritarian 
government” and to “produce a supranational regulatory regime which not only complements, but 
is …more credible than the national systems.”49 
Today the view that the EU as a whole is only a system for rational constraint of the will of the 
Member States is difficult to sustain in the context of ever-increasing competences of the EU to make 
apparent political choices.50 Yet, the constitutional structure of the Union remains essentially one of 
contestatory system for collectivising reason.51 While the particularities of the EU are still well 
explainable on the classical functionalist terms I believe republicanism takes us further, because 
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parties and majority rule?’ (n 33), Andreas Follesdal and Simon Hix, ‘Why There is a Democratic Deficit in the EU: A 
Response to Majone and Moravcsik’ (2006) 44 Journal of Common Market Studies 533-562). Note that politicization is 
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functionalist explanations suit best to the ‘regulatory’ and ‘technical issues’, and are not well fitting 
whit apparent political choices, a limitation republicanism overcomes. 
The most pertinent example of mechanism geared towards integrity of collective decision is the 
‘Community Method’ by which legislation is adopted on proposal of the Commission by the European 
Parliament and the Council acting in sync. Commission is commonly considered to be the executive of 
the EU, but this is imprecise; its primary function is to make expert policy proposals furthering the 
otherwise unrepresented community interest It has been even likened to an independent think-tank.52 
Of course, the Commission may very well promote certain particular interest, but only inasmuch as it 
is rationalised, i.e. presented as best way to attain a common good, which is itself acceptable and 
valuable for all. When such proposal is made, it is subjected to contestations from all sides – member 
states (in Council), factions (in European Parliament), regional and sectoral interests (in the 
Committee of the Regions and in the Economic and Social Committee respectively). More 
importantly, member states in Council tend to accept it (because of the rationality-driven momentum 
behind the proposal) or must provide rational argumentation in order to publicly reject it. This 
contestatory mechanism is protected by a prohibition for the Member States to initiate own proposals, 
thus barring their parochial interests from public space. On the other hand, the Commission must 
propose only Pareto-optimal decisions, for otherwise the interest-representing institutions will not 
adopt them.  On the republican account suggested here, the Commission as the only repository of 
knowledge of the Paneuropean good, is responsible to avoid the false negatives, i.e. ‘failures to 
perceive options that public valuations would support,’53 while the member states in Council are 
responsible to avoid false positives, i.e. from one side to prevent Commission from promoting 
sectional interests as common ones, and on the other hand to prevent disproportional burdening of 
their own interests. This is actually a mirror image of one of Pettit’s model: he suggests that the 
elected institutions should be constrained by expert bodies,54 while with the Community method the 
expert proposals are constrained by political actors. Either way, the effect should be similar; the 
Community method may well go a bit further in the avoidance of false positives by the restriction of 
the legislative incentive of the political actors. It is worthy to emphasise that the Commission has no 
other power to force the acceptance of its proposal except the persuasiveness of the reasons given in 
support of it. Its draft must be so rationalized to make it impossible for (almost) any of the political 
representatives to reject it publicly. For good or worse, the Community method is the most striking 
example of collectivised reason displacing (even if not overcoming!) the popular will.55  
Certainly, not all decisions are taken through the Community method, and in several important 
domains the political will (formed at national level) dominates. The Union is only partly depoliticized 
and it is precisely in the areas where there are robust commitments to common purposes, while where 
they are thin or none, it is merely aggregating the wills of the member states. In the domains of foreign 
policy even after the Lisbon Treaty there is no commitment to a common purpose and that is why it is 
not appropriate to treat the EU as agent at all.  Accordingly, rationalisation through Community 
method is not allowed in the area. The Union acts on ad hoc basis whenever there is political will 
among the Member States.   
The other major method which drives the Union towards premise-centred decision-making, is the 
empowering of citizens to contest European legislation in the European Court of Justice (ECJ) which 
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 Pettit, ‘Depoliticizing Democracy’ (n 17), p. 60. 
54
 ibid. 
55
 It is interesting to note that according to Majone the Commission is a fiduciary representative of the Paneuropean interest, 
which corresponds to Pettit’s concept of indicative representation, even though the arguments of both authors seem 
completely independent from each other. See Majone, Dilemmas of European Integration: The Ambiguities and Pitfalls 
of Integration by Stealth (n 50) and Pettit, ‘Representation, Responsive and Indicative’ (n 18). 
Vesco Paskalev 
12 
made it quite unlike the other international courts. Depoliticization, here in the form of judicialisation, 
again drives decision-making towards more premise-centred mode. Since the 60’s the ECJ 
constitutionalised the four freedoms and constitutionalisation happens to be the first mechanism that 
Pettit mentions in his model of contestatory democracy.  
It should be noted that giving contestatory power to the citizens in the EU context has an even deeper 
effect because while they contest the common will as expressed in the EU legislation they also contest 
the will of their own Member States to vote for that legislation in Council. The latter is breaking the 
presumed singularity of the will of the Member States themselves. If the Member State has formed, in 
whatever manner, a single will at national level, which has resulted in certain regulation in EU level, 
the empowering of citizens to contest the European level decision actually reopens the discussion on 
the premises on the national level as well. In the shadow of such threat, Member States are pushed 
toward a more premise-centred decision-making from the very beginning. The framers of the EU 
certainly had the goal of depoliticizing the decision-making, but ECJ in cooperation with citizens took 
it much further.  
Another contestatory mechanism (which until now fails to deliver upon its promises) can be seen in 
the coveted involvement of national parliaments in public valuation of Union legislation. Within the 
member states the national parliaments occupy the central space for collective reasoning.56 In EU the 
European Parliament is such institution, but with the EU public sphere only nascent57 despite its 
growing formal power it fails to provide avenue for the public actors to contest legislative proposals. 
Vis-à-vis the EU the  national parliaments have been traditionally deliberately disempowered, so they 
have been redundant with regard to contestation of EU policies. Now the Lisbon Treaty introduced the 
so ”yellow card” through which national parliaments are expected to contest draft European 
legislation, in parallel, and probably before the position of their government is expressed or even 
formed. While there may be doubts about the actual efficacy of the mechanism58 this certainly is yet 
another contestatory mechanism for further rationalisation of the EU. In the last section I will return to 
this mechanism again, for now it suffices to say that the involvement of parliament promises to 
obstruct the single voice of member states in EU matters and this drives the collectivisation of 
reasoning up from national to European level.  
The process known as comitology is perhaps the European champion of deliberative democrats. It 
allows the Commission to adopt itself delegated legislation which are subject to review by special 
committees consisting of national experts, like miniature councils. Although the procedures vary 
greatly, the core principle is that if committee members disapprove the proposal they can refer it to the 
Council to decide. In practice in the overwhelming majority of the cases they do not and the proposal 
is effectively approved. Christian Joerges and Jürgen Neyer were perhaps the first to note that the 
comitology committees represent a novel ‘forum for deliberative politics’ where the participants are 
genuinely engaged to establish the common good.59 In a case study of the regulation of foodstuffs they 
found that: 
In comitology, however, preferences cannot be simply asserted, but need to be justified by 
arguments on health risks which are backed by scientific evidence – a feature which seems 
astonishing to international relations theorists, but which was confirmed by all delegates ... and 
which is also supported by our own observations of committee sessions. Thus, relative power 
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would need to be defined with regard to the ability to present and substantiate convincing 
arguments.60 
From the adopted perspective, the comitology committees are fora for contestations – national experts 
can challenge the proposal, but only if they can make the argument that it does not pertain to the 
agreed common purposes. The successful adoption of the proposal supposes that it did and so 
comitology appears to be another procedural route integrity. Note that such contestations are carried 
out by experts supposedly on the reasons justifying the proposal, rather than on the ‘national 
interest.’61 Thus it is plausible to assume that the comitology procedure is as close as we can ever get 
to premise-wise vote. Unfortunately comitology is notoriously untransparent and no study so far could 
provide any evidence for or against this hypothesis.  
The picture is similar if we turn to the internal mode of operation of the Council, COREPER and the 
related working groups. The constructivist scholarship62 finds abundant empirical evidence that 
members and staffers in all these bodies act in non-confrontational, cooperative, ‘pro-norm’63, 
consensual and ‘deliberative mode.’64 They also claim that the decision-making is driven to a 
considerable extend by arguing and not by bargaining. 65  
Certainly none of these should be equated with collective reasoning, integrity or contestation, yet they 
are related in at least two was which are relevant for this paper. The first way is by the central role of 
argumentation and reasons in the decision-making of these bodies which seems undisputed. All of 
these studies support the conclusion that reasons matter, and when they matter systems tend to display 
integrity even if they do not adopt their decisions by explicit premisewise voting.66 The second way is 
by the constraints on the choices placed on the decision-makers – they have to appear cooperative and 
mindful of what is understood as collective purpose. Again although such norm-governed mode is not 
identical with PWM, it can bring about integrity of the decision-making indirectly (as arguably the 
contestatory mechanisms do).67 There are also other features of the decision-making in Council and 
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the like akin to deliberation, most importantly the evidenced frequency of consensus and persuasion, 
but they are not relevant for the argument of this paper.  
Jeffrey Lewis, along to many others, maintains that the observed behaviour in the Council cannot be 
explained within the strategic bargaining paradigm.68 More interestingly, according to him in the 
Council (and the like): 
the negotiators subject claims to group scrutiny for collective legitimation or rejection, with the 
corollary that individuals remain open to be convinced by good arguments.69  
In republican terms this means that the Council is a contestatory institution where proposals are 
subjected to public valuations; those which are exposed as not conforming to the collective reason are 
presumably defeated. While the claims of the constructivist scholarship are far from being undisputed, 
few scholars would deny that reasons play an important part in shaping the outcomes of European 
legislative process.  
COREPER is another institution where argumentation and consensual mode of decision-making are 
abundantly evidenced to warrant the conclusion that it collectivises reason, but it is interesting in 
another way too. This is a COmmittee of the diplomatic REPresentatives of the member states to the 
EU, who in theory are agents of their governments. Again they are often able to reach consensus after 
some negotiation, which means that the position of some of them must have strayed away from the 
initial instructions received by their principals. Certainly, sometimes they have received new 
instructions but this is not always the case. Jeffrey Lewis claims that that members of COREPER  
have earned some notoriety for being able to find consensus on anything given enough time to ‘cut 
slack’ and sell results back home. 70 
and also 
 [an] observable pattern of deliberation, used regularly by COREPER to find solutions, is the 
collective plotting to overcome domestic reserves (‘cut slack’) or force a national capital to rethink 
instructions.71 
COREPER appears to be not only reaching a collectively rational solution, but also to be a kind of 
think-thank engaged in advocacy for it. A member revealed that it is one of their ‘standard practices’72 
to ask the committee to help them persuade their principals and constituencies at home.73 These 
observations are interesting for the present paper above all because they suggest that modus tollens is 
regularly practiced in EU, when the outcome of collective reasoning is internalised by the members of 
the deliberative bodies just like in the car purchase decision model discussed above. Here the motives 
for change of hart may be not only what I called identification; the scholarship has observed that the 
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such is the effect of social norms, webs of informal relationships, comity and the organisational 
culture.74 Yet again participants internalise certain agreement, and then update their premises to align 
the outcomes of individual and collective reasoning.  
From this brief review of the scholarship on the EU it seems that we can generalise what Joerges 
and Neyer observed in comitology to all EU bodies:the institutionalisation of interaction [is] a 
process of internalising new preferences and even identities. Institutionalisation … is a cognitive 
process that involves a redefinition of the self and the other.75 
Joerges and Neyer further note that “delegates, perceiving themselves as part of a transnational 
problem-solving community, may be able to change their governments’ perceptions of interests or 
even simply bypass them.”76 Apparently there is a huge difference between changing and bypassing 
formed national positions; although in both ways integrity is promoted, the latter is democratically 
implausible as it will open rationality gap. However, if members subsequently persuade their 
principles, the system would be practicing modus tollens: representatives collectivise reason in the 
deliberative body, and take the responsibility to change the beliefs of their governments (and ideally 
their fellow citizens) on the premises in order to align their individual conclusions with the collective 
conclusion reached in COREPER and other committees. On the suggested understanding of 
republicanism collective reasoning should go in two directions and therefore the ‘agents’ are not only 
allowed but are responsible to be transmitters in both of the directions.77  
None of this is to say that all or even most of the decisions adopted by the EU are collectively rational. 
While the political scientists evidenced considerable degree of deliberation on reasons and argument-
based contestations in all institutions, the question whether arguing or bargaining is more is bound to 
remain open.78 The empirical students of deliberation should be cautious not to overestimate the 
evidence.79 There are various reasons why collective reasoning may fail even in this most favourable 
of all institutional environments, and in the next section I will turn to one of them which is often 
discussed under the somewhat misleading heading ‘politicization.’  
Yet the studies discussed in this section suggest that the EU is a system geared to collectivise 
reasoning by means of depoliticization and contestation and thus at least some of the decisions are 
taken as if in premise-wise mode. I do not need to engage in the debate how often this is the case, in 
any event it suffices to make the republican perspective appropriate one for the analysis of the EU. On 
the other hand, the Union is a good a test case for civic republicanism – its shortcomings exemplify 
problems that are generally neglected by the republican theory80 like the one I called rationality gap. If 
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 Note that for the argument developed in this paper it is irrelevant whether committee members were actually persuaded or 
had other reasons to internalise the collective decision. 
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 Christian Joerges and Jurgen Neyer, ‘From Intergovernmental Bargaining to Deliberative Political Processes: The 
Constitutionalisation of Comitology’ 3 European Law Journal 273, p. 291 
76
 Joerges and Neyer, ‘Transforming strategic interaction into deliberative problem-solving: European comitology in the 
foodstuffs sector’ (n 60), p. 619. 
77
 Compare again with Parkinson: “the ‘better arguments’ that persuade representatives within a micro-deliberative forum 
will also convince people outside it once they have been exposed to those arguments in their own, separate 
deliberations.” (Parkinson, Deliberating in the Real World (n 27), p. 32).   
78
 Summarising a decade-long research program carried out by constellation of political scientists Deitelhoff and Muller 
suggest that this is impossible to answer. (Deitelhoff and Müller, ‘Theoretical paradise – empirically lost? Arguing with 
Habermas’ (n 41)). 
79
 Niemann for example admits that “negotiations within the Council framework (broadly interpreted) are probably not 
dominated by the deliberation. Strategic action … seem to take the lion’s share under most circumstances. Yet … if the 
conditions are right, genuine deliberation may take over as the chief interaction mode.” Niemann, ‘Deliberation and 
Bargaining in the Article 113 Committee and the 1996/97 IGC Representatives Group’ (n 73), p. 141, emphasis of the 
original.  
80
 Pettit and List discuss what they call impossibility results, which are more general than what I call rationality gap. See List 
and Pettit, ‘Aggregating Sets of Judgments: An Impossibility Result’ (n 4). They suggest how the conditions which lead 
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every decision which abides to the integrity requirement may open a rationality gap, the EU as the 
most rationalised empirical polity is bound to experience it most acutely. Not surprisingly it is 
notoriously known for its ‘democratic deficit.’ On the suggested account the deficit must be 
understood as the difference between what a collectively rational EU decision stipulates and what the 
majority of the member states (or of citizens) would prefer to have it stipulate.81 In other words, this is 
the gap between what counts as ‘our’ decision as a Union and ‘our’ preference as group of members.82 
The sense of alienation or frustration citizens experience are just the symptoms of this persistent and 
systematic difference. 
The legitimacy concerns raised by the democratic deficit have already been abundantly discussed in 
the scholarship and in the next section I will turn to another related problem: it seems that in a system 
of multilevel governance the internalisation of collective reason at one level may abort the deliberation 
at another level perpetuating a rationality gap there. 
Competition for Closure of Deliberating Communities  
In the first section of this paper I have suggested that when a collectively rational decision is 
internalised by the group members, it prompts them to revise their initial beliefs so that the identity of 
collectively rational decision and individually preferred option is restored. This alignment happens 
through practice of modus ponens and modus tollens which for large groups is mediated by 
communication to and fro in what is known as the public sphere.  Without such robust and continuous 
communication in the best case we can have decisions responsive to members’ pre-deliberation beliefs 
which are bound to be mutually inconsistent as the discursive dilemma teaches. At worst we can have 
decisions which are neither collectively rational, nor responsive.83   
I have contrasted collective reason defined in this way, to the ‘popular will’ without specifying the 
latter. I have taken it to mean aggregation of individual beliefs on the conclusions for the desirability 
of the proposed policies. This seems appropriate for many cases - for issues which are not salient and 
do not receive much media attention citizens form their opinions independently from each other. In 
such cases the popular will will be merely a function of their individual attitudes. However in case of 
major issues people discuss them informally – with their friends, families, parties or charities or sports 
clubs. Thus they form what appears as individual opinions in deliberation with others and these 
opinions are at least partly shared within the respective discussing groups. In every democracy while 
bills make their way through the respective institutions, they are informally discussed in the public 
sphere and it is trivial to note that the post-deliberation attitudes will be different; even if entrenched 
interests and pre-deliberative opinions strongly prejudice the outcome, the latter will be at least partly 
modified during the process of decision-making. Thus the popular will properly understood is 
aggregation of the post-deliberation attitudes and in any event it is formed during the process.84  
(Contd.)                                                                  
to such impossibilities can be plausibly relaxed to make the normatively attractive social choice procedure possible. Yet 
these papers are very formal and abstract and they never consider what would the suggested functions look like in the real 
world.   
81
 If we take the member states to stand for the position of their citizens we can interpret the gap as the difference between 
the Union decision and the will of its citizens. But it is uncertain whether we can do that – as the member states 
themselves collectivize reason their position is not identical with their public opinion. On the other hand in nation states 
the two are often be aligned by deliberation in the public sphere as suggested in the preceding section.  
82
 Similar is the understanding of Follesdal and Hix “The bigger problem … is the lack of a connection between the growing 
democratic politics inside the European Parliament and EU Council and the views of the public.” (Follesdal and Hix, 
‘Why There is a Democratic Deficit in the EU: A Response to Majone and Moravcsik’ (n 51), p. 553.) 
83
 It may be suggested that we may have rational and consistent decisions which are not responsive if they are taken by the 
proverbial philosopher king but apparently such decisions are not ‘collective.’  
84
 This informal deliberation is not related (not directly!) with the collective reasoning discussed in the previous section. If 
the group is collectivising reason, its decisions may be different from either of the two opinions. 
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More interestingly, the opinion of every individual will be affected differently by the different peoples 
he deliberates with, and as people can potentially deliberate in several overlapping groups they are 
likely to be driven in conflicting directions. On the other hand, we cannot expect people’s opinions to 
be malleable infinitely, so it is plausible to assume that the same person may end up with different 
post-deliberation attitudes depending on the order of deliberations.85 This suggests that simultaneous 
processes of opinion formations in overlapping communities interfere with each other. Here is how 
political conflicts arise.  
Now, the empirical scholarship on the Council of the EU often reaches strikingly different 
conclusions. For example Jeffrey Lewis provides abundant evidence for cooperation and rational 
persuasion, Pollack and Shaffer evidence none of these in their study of the regime for GMO 
regulation in EU even though the conditions seemed appropriate. They conclude that that “the 
deliberation … has fallen victim to the widespread politicization of the GM issue”86 and more 
importantly that “public opinion severely limited the ability of Member States representatives to 
engage in … deliberative search for the better policy.”87 Numerous other studies also identify 
politicization as a negative condition for reaching reasonable solutions. Prompted by the apparent 
effect of domestic public opinions on the mode of decision-making in the Union institutions, Heather 
McKibben made the prediction that “the more domestically/electorally salient an issue is to a state, the 
more likely that state is to adopt hard bargaining strategies when negotiating over that issue.”88 
Although this remains to be tested, there is an air of uneasiness in finding the intergovernmental 
cooperation and national public opinions at odds with each other.89 
Pollack and Schaffer do not define ‘politicization’ but emphasise that in their case there was a strong 
public opinion in some domestic constituencies, which constrained the agents and prevented them 
from reaching a reasonable solution. Therefore I will take politicization of an issue to mean that the 
public opinion is consolidated on certain position so that deliberation is unlikely to change it any 
further. Politicization in that sense should be distinguished from politicization as involvement of the 
political (as opposed to technocratic) level as the latter does not seem to prevent deliberation; thus I 
can predict that if the domestic discussion is still open-ended politicization per se is not an obstacle.90 
Only when certain single public opinion on the issue is formed and this opinion is internalised as a 
common position of our group by its members further deliberation is derailed. This position may be 
just aggregation of individual preferences (pre- or post-deliberative) of group members or it may result 
from a more subtle practice for collective reasoning, via deliberative institutions. However formed, 
this position must be internalised i.e. a significant number of members have revised their initial 
positions accordingly.91  
                                                     
85
 The order will be only one of the possible factors, certainly some groups may have more influence than others for variety 
of other reasons. 
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 Mark A Pollack and Gregory Shaffer, ‘Risk Regulation, GMOs and the Limits of Deliberation’ in Daniel Naurin and 
Helen Wallace (eds), Unveiling the Council of the European Union: games governments play in Brussels (Palgrave 
Macmillan 2009), p. 149. 
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 ibid, p. 161.  
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 Heather Elko McKibben, ‘Issue characteristics, issue linkage, and states’ choice of bargaining strategies in the European 
Union’ (2010) 17 Journal of European Public Policy 694 - 707, p. 699. 
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 Here again I avoid using the term deliberation which those authors use to describe any cooperative or consensual outcome.  
90
 The political debate is open ended in many different cases, one of which is the case of uncertainty. Indeed many empirical 
studies found that that scientific uncertainty fosters cooperation and deliberation but my hypothesis is this is only one 
special case and even without uncertainty deliberation would flourish also if the public opinion is still divided or the issue 
is not salient so no common opinion is formed at all.  
91
 Note that internalisation of common will closes the rationality gap as argued before. But in this section I am concerned 
with common will and what I mean by its consolidation is equally relevant also for groups which do and do not 
collectivise reason. 
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Public deliberation is the most democratically plausible cause of internalisation92 and the process has 
been observed empirically in various circumstances.93 On the basis of the available empirical literature 
Cass Sunstain concludes that the “effect of deliberation is … to decrease variance among group 
members, as individual differences diminish.”94 Note that the group itself will often exist before and 
independently of the formation of the common will, but in some cases it may be constituted during the 
process itself – such is the case of many civic organisations emerging around a single cause. Whatever 
the method, when a position is formed its understanding as ‘common’ provides incentive for its 
internalisation by members so that the position consolidates and closes for any further challenges, 
deliberative or other. Sunstein observed that “social ties among deliberating group members tend to 
suppress dissent”95 and that is why group may speak with a single voice for what is perceived to be the 
interest and will of all. Such a group is a singular agent with interests of its own and naturally its 
actions are governed by instrumental rationality which uncompromisingly chooses the one best 
alternative. As the agency emerges out of the commitment to certain purpose it is unavoidably 
parochial; it cannot speak for anything but this interest and that is why the issue is effectively closed to 
revision.96 There is no further deliberation internally and members of the relevant group join efforts to 
act in pursuance of the common position and if necessary guard it against external argumentative 
challenges. If the common position is formed but not internalised, it is unstable - external agents may 
appeal to the different inner groupings and shape what will eventually appear as collective opinion. 
This is no longer possible when singular group opinion is formed, such group is an agent with a mind 
of its own.  
I suggest that this is what routinely happens in nation states when they define something as ‘national 
interest’; in principle it may happen also on different levels – on regional level, in minority or 
professional groups, etc. It can happen also on supranational, indeed at any level. Although it is rare to 
witness consolidated public opinion at European level, there was at least one example of such in the 
opposition to the Iraq war which prompted Habermas to announce the birth of European public sphere 
and European demos.97 
Here is not the place to take stock of all consequences of this closing98 but there is an apparent 
problem with the consolidated will in multilevel decision-making systems, where the same citizens 
participate in several nested groups. As the collective opinions ontologically depend on the attitudes of 
the respective individual members, discourses at each level are effectively in competition with each 
other to form consolidated collective opinion. This is the case of the EU where the consolidated 
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 Other means to consolidate common will may be tradition, sense of identity, religion, charisma, ideology, manipulation. 
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 Fishkin’s studies are the most well-known. See most recently James S. Fishkin, When the People Speak: Deliberative 
Democracy and Public Consultation (Oxford University Press, USA 2011). 
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 Sunstein, ‘The Law of Group Polarization’ (n 25), p. 178: He also noted that this leads to the group moving to a more 
extreme position, which is precisely what Pollack and Shaffer observed. 
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 ibid, p. 181. 
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 Recall that List and Pettit emphasise that for a group to act as a single agent it must speak with single voice and display 
integrity, so closure and agency appear to co-originate and constitute each other (List and Pettit, ‘Group Agency. The 
Possibility, Design and Status of Group Agents’ (n 15). Note that this is what allows us to treat collectives as single 
agents; otherwise it would may make no sense to speak about collectives and states in the singular at all. 
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 See Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida, ‘February 15, or What Binds Europeans Together: A Plea for a Common 
Foreign Policy, Beginning in the Core of Europe’ (2003) 10 Constellations 291-297. A decade latter and amid the Euro 
crisis, it is clear that the announcement was quite premature but this does not undermine my point that it is possible to 
happen. 
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 For example such apparent group consensuses often protect hidden exploitation as the critical legal studies have forcefully 
demonstrated.  
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collective will formed at one level precluded further deliberation at the others.99 Apparently such 
competition is inevitable even in ideal speech situation. In such case the competition may continue ad 
infinitum (if personal opinions change infinitely) or perhaps the most universal discourse may pre-
empt all the others. In the non-ideal case the malleability of individual opinions is finite and at some 
point of time common will is formed and the discourse stops. Closing allows the nations to speak in 
single voice, which is necessary for their capacity to achieve goals. However this thwarts any further 
argumentative challenges as inimical to “national interests.”  Closing creates the distinction between 
the perceived interests of the members of the nation from what may be rival interests of the others.100 
The outcome of opinion formation varies according to the location of the boundaries of the 
deliberative space; within the boundaries individual opinions tend to homogenize and polarize. 
Now, in the EU the interests of all European citizens are legitimately to be taken into account, yet the 
public spaces remain largely national and exclusionary.101 We may assume counterfactually that 
communication in a Paneuropean public sphere emerging around the Union institutions would 
decrease variances in individual wills of all of the citizens (as it does in national spheres) and ideally 
produce European opinion tending interests which are European. However, the existing internal 
borders create deliberating subgroups tending the respective parochial interests. The latter not only 
find their opinions thwarted by the EU decisions but also impede the communicative process at the 
upper level which appears as external challenge to them.102  
The dialectic of homogenisation and radicalisation of deliberative groups puts the overlapping groups 
into competition with each other to form ‘their’ will and close themselves in protection thereof. Given 
that in our post-metaphysical and post-traditional world ‘common interests’ are all socially constructed 
and the means to construct them is by deliberation in the public sphere. Overlapping groups compete 
for the souls of their individual members – they compete to construct ‘their’ shared beliefs and 
preferences and their success depends on the actual communicative practices. To succeed, groups must 
improve the communicative conditions in their public spheres in order to construct such consensus that 
is both quick and can be internalised by all or most members. The construction of more robust and 
more inclusive public spheres is what determines the success of a group to form a consolidated 
opinion which allows it to formulate and protect an ‘own’ group interest. Only in this way they can 
sustain their capacity to act in pursuance of their perceived goals103 without being constantly 
undermined by yawning rationality gaps. Closing the rationality gaps appears to be not only a matter 
of legitimacy but also of sustainability of the group. On the other hand, when public deliberation 
within the group fails to close it in this way, there is a chance for opinion formation at a different 
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 Note that despite the alleged commonality of values etc, the opinions reached at each level are bound to be at odds with 
each other because the inclusion of different deliberators on the upper level leads to introduction of different information 
and different considerations. 
100
 Compare the suggested notion of closing against deliberative challenges with Hannah Arendt’s claim that in Ancient 
Greece the democratic politics became possible only within the city walls which protected the agora from external 
challenges (Hannah Arendt, ‘The promise of politics’ (Schocken Books 2007)). For Arendt the distinction internal – 
external is constitutive for public space. It is fundamental also for republicanism which needs finite number of 
participants in the collective reasoning and also finite set of relevant considerations. Nowadays the authority of the EU 
penetrates borders yet public discourses cannot (yet) transcend it. 
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 Notwithstanding that there is a nascent EU public space – see Risse, ‘An Emerging European Public Sphere? Theoretical 
Clarifications and Empirical Indicators’ (n 57). He and several collaborators in series of studies during the first decade of 
the century found that “same European themes are discussed at the same time at similar level of attention across national 
public spheres”, however the overall attention paid to these issues remains low.  
102
 European integration opens the decision-making institutions to external normative and argumentative interventions and 
may prevents the adoption of single-minded parochial decisions. However this is not matched by sufficiently robust of 
national public spheres. The yellow card mechanism discussed above promises to contribute to the latter, but its efficacy 
is still to be seen.    
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 Recall the argument of List and Pettit for collective reason as enabling condition, List and Pettit, ‘Group Agency. The 
Possibility, Design and Status of Group Agents’ (n 15).  
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(higher) level. Although will formation at national level usually is much faster, there are many cases 
when the issue is too technical, too uncontroversial or not sufficiently salient so no national will is 
formed. This is the case of ‘uncertainty’ which was identified as condition enabling deliberation by 
many scholars.104 However on the suggested account it is not the mere uncertainty but the availability 
of multiple voices in cases of uncertainty which makes a difference.105 Even though the constitutional 
system of the Union generally opens the national public spaces to the pressure of argumentative 
rationality,106 the deliberative homogenization of national opinions closes the borders again.  
Similarly, many studies blamed publicity for thwarting cooperation. On the suggested account of 
competition for opinion formation publicity in Council and the related bodies will prevent cooperation 
only when there is consolidated will already formed at national level. Consolidated positions will 
prevail because they constrain the agents to uphold them even if they are argumentatively defeated. On 
the contrary, when positions are not consolidated, argumentative rationality may support the position 
of internal dissenters and the delegate may side with them to change the initial determination. 
To sum up, my claim is that in a multilevel polity rationality gaps occur on each level, each level of 
rationalization has to deal with its own frustrations. But the popular will whose frustration matters 
most is the one that is formed deliberatively at another level because it affects the discursive processes 
on the other levels. General will is formed by public deliberation where intended or where not 
intended. Wherever it is formed it tends to consolidate and close to further deliberative challenges. In 
modern multilevel systems will formation may close at level different from the one that is actually 
empowered, and then deficits appear.  
Conclusion 
One of the purposes of this paper was to expose a problem neglected in the republican theory which I 
called rationality gap. The other was to suggest that republican theory provides better understanding of 
the EU, which is a highly rationalised polity and its notorious democratic deficit appears to be a good 
empirical illustration of the gap. Yet my claim is that all rationalised polities are bound to face gaps, as 
they arise from the logical distinction between collective and individual rationality, both of which 
have legitimate claims to prevail. Thus, the democratic deficit of the EU is a logical necessity rather 
than institutional contingency and the host of institutional reforms which have been proposed to solve 
it are bound to fail.  
I have also suggested that rationality gap sometimes is closed when during the process of decision-
making citizens internalise the collectively rational decisions. This happens through stepwise process 
of communication in the public sphere when common opinions which are perceived as national 
interests are formed; that is why nation states, albeit themselves rationalised, do not experience acute 
rationality gaps too often. When this process is successful citizens identify with the collective position 
as their own and revise their initial beliefs. Thus the communicative process is closed to further 
discursive challenges. This could potentially happen at European level by communication in the 
nascent Paneuropean public sphere; however the discourse is often pre-empted by the competitive 
discourses in the more robust public spheres of the member states. As the communication there is 
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 Note that uncertainty is not an exogenous factor but itself is a matter of perception; in the GMO controversy discussed by 
Pollock and Shaffer the opponents of the technology believed it the effects of genetic engineering are uncertain, and the 
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overcome the consolidated national positions. 
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 As Risse and Kleine note “speakers could never be sure whether their audiences held national preferences, party 
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‘Deliberation in Negotiations’ (2010) 17 Journal of European Public Policy 708-726, p. 16. 
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more robust, citizens form their opinion there, and given that deliberating groups tend toward 
homogenization and polarization, this derails the simultaneous communicative process at EU level. 
Although the paper is intended to offer better understanding rather than solutions to the latter problem 
two possible escape routes seem obvious. The first is to integrate national public spaces by connecting 
them into a network so that the discourses on policy issues spill from one national public sphere to 
another. Even if citizens deliberate mainly locally, discourses may be connected so that they transcend 
the national boundaries and ideally produce genuine Paneuropean opinions. The second is by biting 
the bullet – whenever the EU institutions identify a problem and reach a decision before contrary will 
is formed at another level, the rationality gap will close at European level. Albeit the first option may 
seem utopian, neither of the two is radical and in any case neither requires major constitutional 
changes. 
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